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UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
the work from which I obviously borrow - although, especially in this
regard, I do not mean for this essay to be a definitive account.
A.
I take as my point of departure the first paragraph of Justice
Kogan's dissent in City of North Miami v. Kurtz:
As the majority itself notes, job applicants are free to return to
tobacco use once hired. I believe this concession reveals the non-
smoking policy to be rather more of a speculative pretense than a
rational governmental policy. Therefore I would find it unconstitu-
tional under the right of due process. See Department of Law
Enforcement v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d 957 (Fla. 1991).'
In Kurtz, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of
an administrative regulation adopted by the City of North Miami that
required all job applicants to sign an affidavit stating that they had not
used tobacco for a period of at least one year immediately preceding
their application for employment.5 Applicants who refused to supply the
affidavit would not be hired. Justice Overton, writing for a majority of
the court, held that the rights of privacy recognized by Florida and
United States constitutional law did not cover this case, and that there-
fore the regulation was lawful.6
Justice Kogan did not disagree directly with the majority's privacy
analysis - but he did think that it was "troublesome." 7 His specific con-
cern was that a "slippery slope" would result: "[I]f governmental
employers can inquire too extensively into off-job-site behavior, a point
eventually will be reached at which the right of privacy ... clearly will
be breached."8 For example, Kogan thought, inquiry into "lawful sexual
behavior" or "plans for procreation" might violate the privacy right;
''any governmental effort to identify those who might eventually suffer
from cancer or heart disease" would be similarly invalid.9
B.
There are difficulties in the majority's approach in Kurtz evident
even within the terms of the case itself. Justice Overton concluded that
the North Miami regulation is not inconsistent with the right of privacy
protected by Article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution.' 0 The
4. City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d 1025, 1029 (Pa. 1995)(Kogan, J., dissenting).
5. See id. at 1026 (summarizing regulation).
6. Justice Shaw joined Justice Kogan's dissent. See id. at 1029.
7. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id.
10. Article 1, section 23 states: "Every natural person has the right to be let alone and free
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crucial question, it seemed, was whether Ms. Kurtz "has a legitimate
expectation of privacy.""I She did not.
In today's society, smokers are constantly required to reveal whether
they smoke. When individuals are seated in a restaurant, they are
asked whether they want a table in a smoking or a non-smoking sec-
tion. When individuals rent hotel or motel rooms, they are asked if
they smoke so that management may ensure that certain rooms
remain free from the smell of smoke odors. Likewise, when individ-
uals rent cars, they are asked if they smoke so that rental agencies can
make proper accommodations to maintain vehicles for non-smokers.
Further, employers generally provide smoke-free areas for non-smok-
ers, and employees are often prohibited from smoking in certain
areas. Given that individuals must reveal whether they smoke in
almost every aspect of life in today's society, we conclude that indi-
viduals have no reasonable expectation of privacy in the disclosure of
that information when applying for a government job.' 2
The question of expectations is a familiar one in Florida privacy
law.' 3 But it seems to suppose that disclosure really was the issue in
Kurtz. Ms. Kurtz, however, wanted to work for North Miami. She pre-
sumably objected to the city requirement not because she wanted to keep
her smoking secret, but because she did not want to be put to the choice
of either quitting smoking and waiting a year or lying about her smoking
history.' 4 Her argument, we might think, was at bottom a claim that
whether or not she smoked off-work was her choice.' 5 Constitutional
analysis, therefore, should address whether privacy protection encom-
passes the decision to smoke or not smoke tobacco. Perhaps the willing-
ness of smokers to identify themselves, and to abide by smoking
segregation and no-smoking rules, are indicators that the smoking deci-
sion is not one that, "in today's society," individuals might reasonably
expect they would make for themselves.1 6 Overton's examples, how-
from governmental intrusion into his private life except as otherwise provided herein. This
section shall not be construed to limit the public's right of access to public records and meetings
as provided by law." Fla. Const., art. I, § 23.
11. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1028.
12. Id.
13. See, e.g., Gerald B. Cope, Jr., To Be Let Alone: Florida's Proposed Right of Privacy, 6
FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 671, 742 (1978). For thoughtful discussion of some of the intricacies of
expectations analysis, see Joseph Beatty, Case Comment, Constitutional Law: Is the Expectation
of Privacy Under the Florida Constitution Broader in Scope Than It Is Under the Federal
Constitution?, 47 FLA. L. REV. 287 (1995).
14. "Kurtz told the interviewer that she was a smoker and could not truthfully sign an
affidavit to comply with the regulation." Kurtz v. City of North Miami, 625 So. 2d 899, 900 (Fla.
3d DCA 1993), quashed, 653 So. 2d 1025 (Fla. 1995).
15. The district court of appeal analyzed the case in these terms. See id. at 902-03.
16. "Would we allow the police to search the sacred precincts of marital bedrooms for telltale
signs of the use of contraceptives? The very idea is repulsive to the notions of privacy
1999]
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ever, do not in truth show shared responsibility for smoking choices "in
almost every aspect of life." Restaurant use, hotel stays, and car rentals
are more or less marginal activities. In any case, as with no-smoking
rules at work, no-smoking and smoking segregation rules in places of
public accommodation at most require individuals to limit smoking for
short periods of time - much less than a year. ' 7 It also might matter that
North Miami is a government entity as well as an employer. As Justice
Overton himself noted, Article I, section 23, singles out government
agencies - "governmental intrusion" - as bearers of the constitutional
obligation to respect privacy. 8 Whatever the situation elsewhere "in
today's society," within government, circumstances might be supposed
to be different.
North Miami, of course, was also bound to respect federal constitu-
tional protections of privacy. The Kurtz majority thought, however, that
"the federal constitution's implicit privacy provision extends only to
such fundamental interests as marriage, procreation, contraception, fam-
ily relationships, and the rearing and educating of children."' 9 Smoking
was not equivalently "fundamental." Again, it is easy to raise questions.
Justice Overton characterized federal law in terms derived from then-
Justice Rehnquist's majority opinion in Paul v. Davis.2° Other Justices
of the United States Supreme Court have, at least sometimes, proceeded
on the assumption that the federal privacy right extends beyond ques-
tions of intimate association. The often-cited majority opinion of Justice
Stevens in Whalen v. Roe supplies one example. 21 In Cruzan v. Direc-
tor, Missouri Department of Health,22 now-Chief Justice Rehnquist him-
self agreed, at least for purposes of the case at hand, that "the United
States Constitution would grant "a competent person a constitutionally
protected right to refuse lifesaving hydration and nutrition" - a privacy
right plainly not put in "family" terms.23 Justice Overton thus possessed
surrounding the marriage relationship." Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479, 485 (1965). See
John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 930
(1973).
17. See Beatty, supra note 13, at 294 n.66.
18. See Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1028.
19. Id.
20. 424 U.S. 693, 713 (1976).
21. See Whalen v. Roe, 429 U.S. 589, 598-600 (1977). But see Note, Toward a Right of
Privacy as a Matter of State Constitutional Law, 5 FLA. ST. U. L. REv. 631, 681 (1977) (Whalen
"represents no substantial change" in scope of federal right of personal choice).
22. 497 U.S. 261 (1990).
23. Id. at 279; see also Washington v. Harper, 494 U.S. 210 (1990) (recognizing "liberty
interest" in refusing administration of psychotropic drugs). Arguably, while divided as to the
result in the case, a majority of the Justices in Washington v. Glucksberg, a "right to die" case
decided after Kurtz, agreed in concluding federal constitutional protection of private choice
extended to at least some matters other than intimate association. 521 U.S. 702 (1997).
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at least some leeway in stating federal law and might have explored the
matter of "fundamentality" at more length. The decision to smoke ciga-
rettes is plainly fundamental in the sense that it has obviously serious
consequences and, once made in favor of smoking, is not easy to
reverse. 4 If these are not relevant earmarks, further explanation would
appear to be in order.
As though attempting to moot criticism, Justice Overton argued
that, in any event, North Miami could show a compelling interest in
reducing health care costs.25 The issue, however, is not the value of
savings as such, but whether savings should come at the expense of indi-
viduals who choose to smoke off-work. Usual less restrictive alternative
questioning would have put North Miami to the task of showing at least
that no other obvious way of delimiting the applicant pool would have
achieved similar savings.26 The Kurtz majority emphasized that individ-
uals were free to return to smoking off-work once they were hired.2
But this amelioration - which presumably reduces the expected cost sav-
ings at least somewhat - cannot vindicate the use of the smoking cate-
gory in the first place.
C.
Justice Kogan believed that Kurtz was better understood as a due
process case, of a piece with the Florida Supreme Court's decision in
Real Property. Real Property resolved a facial challenge to the constitu-
tionality of the Florida Comprehensive Forfeiture Act.2" The Act, in
essence, authorizes state attorneys to obtain from circuit courts orders
declaring real property used in the commission of felonies to be for-
feited. Justice Barkett, writing for a unanimous Florida Supreme Court,
held that the Act did not, as written, contravene due process require-
ments if its brief descriptions of forfeiture actions were understood to
incorporate, however implicitly, due process norms. The opinion, very
much in the manner of an administrative gloss, supplied the missing
required terms. Real Property is plainly good work. But what does it
have to do with Kurtz?
It is useful to begin comparatively. Chief Justice Rehnquist, writ-
ing the nominal majority opinion of the United States Supreme Court in
24. The question of reversibility is emphasized in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535, 541
(1942). It would not have been difficult, therefore, to distinguish questions of personal autonomy
involving hairstyles, for example. See Kelley v. Johnson, 425 U.S. 238 (1976).
25. See City of N. Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So.2d 1025, 1028-29 (Fla. 1995).
26. See, e.g., Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 229 (1982).
27. Kurtz, 653 So.2d at 1029.
28. Fla. Stat. §§ 932.701 - 932.704.
1999]
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Bennis v. Michigan2 9 in 1996, declared that "longstanding practice" pre-
vented close analysis of the question of whether a co-owner of an auto-
mobile which was used in the commission of a crime and declared
forfeit to the state was deprived of property without due process of law
within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment of the United States
Constitution." There was, Rehnquist acknowledged, "in the abstract...
considerable appeal" to the argument that it was "unfair" to "relieve[ ]
prosecutors from the burden of separating co-owners who are complicit
in the wrongful use of property from innocent co-owners."3 Nonethe-
less, he concluded, "the cases authorizing actions of the kind at issue are
'too firmly fixed in the punitive and remedial jurisprudence of the coun-
try to be now displaced."' 32 Bennis is a very different case from Real
Property. An automobile is personal property.33 The innocent-owner
defense is expressly recognized in the Comprehensive Forfeiture Act.3 4
Against the backdrop of Florida's constitutional law, however, what is
perhaps most striking is the evident conclusion of the United States
Supreme Court that forfeiture actions are "governed more by history
than by constitutional logic. '35 In Real Property, it is clear, Justice Bar-
kett worked within a very different due process jurisprudence.
The gist of Barkett's approach lies in this passage:
Just as we recognize the significance of the interests of property own-
ers and lienholders, we also recognize that the state has substantial
interests in restraining the use of potentially forfeitable property to
punish criminal wrongdoers; to seek retribution for society; to deter
29. 516 U.S. 442 (1996).
30. Id. at 1001.
31. Id.
32. Id. (quoting J.W. Goldsmith Jr. in Grant Co. v. United States, 254 U.S. 505, 511 (1921)).
33. See Department of Law Enf. V. Real Poperty, 588 So. 2d at 957, 965-66 (Fla. 1991)
(defining different procedures for cases involving forfeiture of personal property).
34. Fla. Stat. § 932.703(2).
35. City of Miami v. Kershbro, Inc., 717 So.2d 601, 604 (Fla. 3d DCA 1998). The use of
history as a justification for forfeiture law was powerfully criticized in Tamara Piety, Comment,
Scorched Earth: How the Expansion of Civil Forfeiture Doctrine Has Laid Waste to Due Process,
45 U. MIAMI L. REv. 911 (1991), published just prior to Real Property. In fact, close reading of
Chief Justice Rehnquist's opinion in Bennis, along with the concurring opinions of Justices
Thomas and Ginsburg, shows considerable effort to leave open the possibility of reading Bennis
narrowly. See Bennis, 116 S. Ct. at 1000 (hypothetical case left for future); id. at 1001
(emphasizing judicial discretion within Michigan process); id. at 1002-03 (Thomas, J., concurring)
(easy case on its facts); id. at 1003 (Ginsburg, J., concurring) (Michigan supreme court "stands
ready to police exorbitant applications"). At least with regard to forfeitures ordered as punishment
in federal criminal proceedings, the United States Supreme Court has held the Excessive Fines
Clause of the Eighth Amendment sets a proportionality limit on property subject to forfeiture
which is not itself a means used in performing the crime triggering prosecution. See United States
v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321 (1998). Language in the Bajakajian majority (a 5-4 decision)
indicates the proportionality standard would also apply in civil forfeiture proceedings, which are
in part punitive. See id. at 2035 n.6.
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continued use of the property for criminal activity; to remedy the
wrongs done to society; and to compensate the state for its law
enforcement services... However, the means by which the state can
protect its interest must be narrowly tailored to achieve its objective
through the least restrictive alternative where such basic rights are at
stake.36
"Just as we recognize . we also recognize..." Property rights of
individuals and the law enforcement concerns of government are equally
constitutionally significant. There is no priority in principle. With
respect to outcomes, therefore, we should be agnostic. Due process
requires only that the statutory scheme acknowledge this indifference.
But, it turns out, much follows. Legislation must avoid overbreadth and
address only the problem which provokes it.37 Prosecutors enforcing the
statutory program must respect a remedial hierarchy. They cannot seize
seemingly forfeitable property on the basis of a probable cause warrant
obtained ex parte if other effective ways of restraining disposition of the
property are available - lis pendens, restraining orders, etc.38 Whenever
possible, there must be notice and prior hearing. 39  Prosecutors ulti-
mately must offer clear and convincing evidence that property has been
put to use in criminal activity.4 ° It is, however, enough for individuals -
"innocent" holders of property rights - to establish by a preponderance
of the evidence that they had no knowledge of even convincingly-shown
criminal activity in order to immunize their interests.41 The security of
36. Real Property, 588 So 2d. at 957.
37. Justice Barkett, again writing for a unanimous Florida Supreme Court, subsequently
declared invalid under Real Property a Florida statute authorizing seizure of aircraft equipped
with fuel tanks not approved by the Federal Aviation Administration:
On its face, section 330.40 automatically converts every aircraft with
nonconforming fuel tanks, whether airworthy or not, and whether involved in
criminal activity or not, into contraband subject to forfeiture.... Here, as we have
said, Anacaola's aircraft was parked; the sheriff did not allege that the airplane had
been, was being, or was about to be used in the commission of a felony.... As the
trial court noted, the legislature has available many other less restrictive means to
assure compliance with FAA regulations. And in the event that an aircraft is being
used as a criminal instrumentality, the forfeiture act already provides for forfeiture
of such aircraft.
In re Forfeiture of 1969 Piper Navajo, 592 So. 2d 233, 236 (Fla. 1992).
38. See Real Property, 588 So. 2d at 964-65; see also Ruth v. Department of Legal Affairs,
684 So. 2d 181 (Fla. 1996) (finding no forfeiture of property, only equitable decree as between
defendant and government, if no in rem jurisdiction).
39. See Real Property, 588 So. 2d at 965-67. See, e.g., Byrom v. Gallagher, 609 So.2d 24
(Fla. 1992).
40. See Real Property, 598 So. 2d at 967. In federal civil forfeiture proceedings, notably,
prosecutors need to show only probable cause to believe property is subject to forfeiture. It is then
the burden of property owners to establish, by a preponderance of the evidence, that no crime in
fact occurred, or that the property at issue lacked a sufficient connection with the crime. See
David Pimental, Forfeiture Procedure in Federal Court: An Overview, 183 F.R.D. 1, 15 (1999).
41. See Real Property, 598 So. 2d at 967.
1999]
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property rights is a primary procedural concern even though property
rights are regarded as existing at risk, vulnerable to forfeiture depending
on how they are put to use, therefore always substantively qualified.
D.
However ingenious, how does the Real Property due process meth-
odology work in the Kurtz context? Ms. Kurtz was just a job applicant.
She had no entitlement - not even a substantively qualified one - to a
North Miami job.42 She might have argued that she had a kind of "lot-
tery ticket" right: a right to a fair chance to "win" a job.4 3 This argu-
ment in the end leads to a discussion of whether restricting the North
Miami applicant pool to nonsmokers is constitutional. Kurtz would
claim, much as she would if the issue were privacy, that she was free to
choose for herself whether to smoke tobacco off-work. In due process
terms, she would be asserting the existence of a constitutionally-recog-
nized liberty interest. But why does this particular choice come within
constitutional "liberty"? Ultimately, I will conclude that the idea of
"due process of law" itself is intertwined with a relevant conception of
liberty, captured in the phrase "self-government," pointing towards a
way of analyzing the Kurtz case (and many other "privacy" cases). I
begin, however, by examining the idea of the right to choose as it has
figured in privacy discussions.
Does the right to choose whether to smoke tobacco have anything
in common with rights of individual choice already acknowledged as
encompassed within the right of privacy? Privacy rights often are
explained by referring to notions of "self-determination" or "personal
autonomy."" Choices are left private because they are in some sense
"too personal" to be treated otherwise. Increasingly, however, at least in
academic writing, the obvious question-begging encoded in the conclu-
sion "too" and the equally obvious difficulty inherent in any theory of
"self' or "personality,"45 prompt efforts to begin from a reversed per-
42. Cf. Lite v. State, 617 So. 2d 1058, 1060 (Fla. 1993) (finding Real Property forfeiture
analysis inapposite regarding termination of driver's license since license is a "privilege").
43. The right would not be a right to a municipal job, or a right to a chance of some somehow
set probability, but simply a right to the same chance as all other applicants. Cf. Associated Gen.
Contractors v. City of Jacksonville, 508 U.S. 656, 666 (1993) (holding an interest in competing on
"equal basis" for government contract sufficient to establish standing).
44. See Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 9 (Fla. 1990); Krischer v. Mclver, 697
So.2d 97, 111, 113 (Fla. 1997) (Kogan, C.J., dissenting). See, e.g., Roberts v. United States
Jaycees, 468 U.S. 609, 615 (1984) ("ability to define.., identity ... is central to any concept of
liberty"); LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONsTrrtnIONAL LAW 1312 (2d ed. 1988) (right of
privacy protects against "governmental invasion of personality").
45. It may be that the very notion of the "self" is too analytically fragile to support much
analysis. See DEREK PARFIT, REASONS AND PERSONS (1984). The problem also lies, at least in
[Vol. 53:395
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spective. Constitutional respect for personal choice follows from a the-
ory of government rather than a theory of self-"public privacy," as it
were.
4 6
Thus, in a famous pathbreaking article, Jed Rubenfeld argues that
the right of privacy should be understood as constitutional protection
against "creeping totalitarianism. 4a
Privacy takes its stand at the outer boundaries of the legitimate exer-
cise of state power. It is to be invoked only where the government
threatens to take over or occupy our lives - to exert its power in some
way over the totality of our lives.4a
What government does reveals what privacy is. The problem posed by
government prohibition of a woman's right to choose abortion, for
example, is readily identifiable in Rubenfeld's terms - the positive effect
of the prohibition is to put pregnant women in a state of "forced mother-
hood. ' 49  James Fleming, in another prominent effort, begins with
requirements of constitutional governance, suggesting that individual
rights protected in American constitutional law are either rights like free
speech or equal protection, rights presupposed by "deliberative democ-
part, in the fact that individual choices are often choices about associations and commitments. To
see the value of the choice solely in terms of its freedom, and not also in the content of the
associations or commitments, seemingly skews judgment. Michael Sandel makes this argument
forcefully:
"[T]reating persons as freely choosing, independent selves may fail to respect
persons encumbered by convictions or life circumstances that do not admit the
independence the liberal self-image requires. In different ways, the sabbath
observers in Connecticut, the victims of racial defamation in Chicago, the Holocaust
survivors in Skokie, the feminists against pornography in Indianapolis, the
homosexuals denied privacy in Georgia, and the traditional mothers and
homemakers impoverished by divorce are all situated selves with good reason to
resist the demand to bracket their identities... ; their concerns cannot be translated
without loss into ... voluntarist, individuated terms .. "
MICHAEL J. SANDEL, DEMOCRACY'S DiscoNTEmTs: AMERICA IN SEARCH OF A PUBLIC PHILOSO-
PHY 116 (1996). For Sandel's earlier development of this idea, see MICHAEL J. SANDEL, LIBER-
ALISM AND THE LIMrrs OF JUSTICE 175-83 (1982); see also JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALIrY OF
FREEDOM 198 (1986).
46. I do not mean to suggest that defenders of individual autonomy ignore government.
"[T]he Constitution's is not a totalitarian design, depending for its success upon the
homogenization or depersonalization of humanity." TRIBE, supra note 44, at 1308. But the key
within this perspective is "the nature of the right being asserted." Id. at 1307. It is because
"personhood ... is sufficiently one's own" that it may "be deemed fundamental in confrontation
with the one entity that retains a monopoly over legitimate violence - the government." Id. at
1305-06.
47. Jed Rubenfeld, The Right of Privacy, 102 HARv. L. Rav. 737, 784 (1989).
48. Id. at 787.
49. Id. at 788. Prohibiting abortion "shapes women's occupations and preoccupations in the
minutest detail; it creates a perceived identity for women and confines them to it; and it gathers up
a multiplicity of approaches to the problem of being a woman and reduces them all to the single
norm of motherhood." Id.
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racy," or rights securing "deliberative autonomy," Fleming's interpreta-
tion of the right of privacy - rights of conscience and association.50
Deliberation - what we demand of representative democracy - is also
precisely the capacity possessed by individuals that we should protect.
"If persons do not have the freedom to deliberate about and make such
decisions, they are not free."'"
Plainly, Rubenfeld and Fleming do not suggest bases for bringing
the decision whether or not to smoke tobacco within the terms of a pri-
vacy right. Denying access to a government job is not the same thing as
an order not to smoke if other jobs are available free from the no-smok-
ing condition. In any case, a smoking ban - even if compliance would
be extremely difficult - is not an exercise of government "power...
over the totality of our lives." Even more obviously, smoking is hardly a
matter of conscience or association.
The literal implications of the Rubenfeld and Fleming formulations
are not the point, however. "Creeping totalitarianism" is a fine phrase
but it supplies at best an awkward analytics. Proscription of abortion is
mandatory motherhood only close up. If we suppose that women also
have a right to choose to use contraception, is it so clear that government
is conscripting women to be breeders? Would a ban on contraception,
given the chanciness of pregnancy, be tantamount to conscription? So
too, although it is clear that freedom of conscience and association are
prerequisites for autonomy, there are also obviously others - for exam-
ple, necessary quanta of health and economic well-being. Limiting
autonomy to "deliberative" matters is not an easy restriction to under-
stand. Are individual freedoms of conscience and association prerequi-
sites of "deliberative democracy"? It is unclear why participation in
political life necessitates personal control over child-bearing decisions,
for example. Parents vote and hold public office routinely. But if
"deliberative autonomy" is important independent of political process, it
must be because deliberation is valuable for its own sake. Conscience
and association are not all that autonomy requires, but they are, it may
be supposed, principal subjects of personal deliberation. We know,
however, that matters of conscience and choice of intimate (or even
political or business) associates are often not exclusively subjects of rea-
soned judgment - matters also, for example, of faith, hope, and love.
Does it make sense, therefore, to think of these choices as matters of
"deliberation"?5 2
50. See James E. Fleming, Securing Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1 (1995).
"Deliberative democracy" is supposed to summarize theories of representative government and
linked constitutional rights like those put forward by John Hart Ely and Cass Sunstein.
51. Id. at 33.
52. For Professor Fleming's response to questions of this sort, see id. at 33-36.
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The problem, we may think, is the need Rubenfeld and Fleming
feel to define their ideas of privacy in terms that are ultimately decisive.
They acknowledge, however obliquely, the possibility that counter-
vailing considerations might block protection of privacy rights.53 But
the terms within which the privacy right itself is put, in both cases, are
not at all tentative - plainly mean to be preemptive. This is not, obvi-
ously, the approach of Justice Barkett in Real Property - property rights
figure mostly at the threshold, as a starting point (or motivation) for a
larger inquiry. The decisiveness that Rubenfeld and Fleming attempt to
build into their accounts of privacy, and therefore the reciprocal close
scrutiny that their accounts trigger, is not required by their own entirely
correct shared premise. It is surely true that constitutions drafted on the
assumption of popular sovereignty cannot, if that assumption is to be
meaningful, leave governments entirely free to fix as they see fit the
beliefs and agendas of the people who are declared to be sovereign.54
Popular sovereignty obtains, therefore, only if legislative jurisdiction is
in the end not exhaustive - that is, only if it co-exists with some non-
trivial and nonaccidental regime of self-government. Hobbes, it must
appear, was wrong.55  Co-existence, however, does not require mutual
53. See, e.g., id. at 45-46; Rubenfeld, supra note 47, at 793-94.
54. It is easy to associate government efforts to manage individual preferences with ancient
regime absolutism and early modern conceptions of the "police" state, and therefore link notions
of self-rule with resistance to kingly overweening. See, e.g., DANIEL GORDON, CITIZENS WITHOUT
SOVEREIGNTY: EQUALITY AND SOCIABILITY IN FRENCH THOUGHT 1670-1789, 9-24 (1994) ("The
Well-Policed State"); QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 59-99 (1998) ("Free states
and individual liberty"). By referring to images of "totalitarian democracy" and the like, we might
"fast forward" through the French Revolution into the apocalyptic middle of the twentieth century.
See generally, J.L. TALMON, THE ORIGINS OF TOTALITARIAN DEMOCRACY (Norton ed. 1970). But
constitutional thought as such, early and late, has also recognized a part properly to be played by
government management of preferences (sometimes through the constitutional project itself.)
Counter-reformation constitutional theory is especially provocative in this regard. See QUENTIN
SKINNER, THE FOUNDATIONS OF MODERN POLITICAL THOUGHT: THE AGE OF REFORMATION 133-
73 (1978). On the Carolene Products strain of constitutional theory as preference definition, and
therefore preference management, see PAUL W. KAHN, LEGITIMACY AND HISTORY: SELF-
GOVERNMENT IN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 167-70 (1992). Within American
constitutional jurisprudence in particular, though, there is a recurring counter effort to preserve the
possibility of an individual point of view meaningfully independent of government manipulation.
It is not just prominent constitutional guarantees of freedom of religion that are pertinent here.
The equally notable Warren Court effort to isolate the definition of election districts from
legislative efforts to preserve a status quo are also relevant. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S.
533 (1964); Gomillion v. Lightfoot, 364 U.S. 339 (1960). So too, and perhaps startlingly, the
ideas of popular sovereignty and individual independence, and the problem of government
manipulation, also substantially organize Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), Chief Justice
Warren's attempt to supply constitutional premises for a democratic "police" state.
55. "The greatest liberty of subjects, dependeth on the silence of the law.... In cases where
the sovereign has prescribed no rule, there the subject hath the liberty to do, or forbear, according
to his own discretion. And therefore such liberty is in some places more, and in some less as they
that have the sovereignty shall think most convenient." THOMAS HOBBES, LEVIATHAN 165-66 (M.
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exclusivity, some pre-set division of labor. It is enough that the legisla-
tive jurisdiction of government is incomplete, that it is sufficiently punc-
tuated or broken up by acts of individual decision. A constitutional
description of rights need not be definitive; need not pick out only rights
which seem self-evident, always or almost always worthy of enforce-
ment. 6 If it results often enough in the defeat of government claims of
jurisdiction, a Barkett-like theory of the right to choose, an account of
rights supposed to trigger open-ended inquiry, is therefore an available
alternative.
The key, I think, lies in an account of popular sovereignty and law
in terms that treat self-rule not simply as the origin of representative
legislatures, through systems of election, free debate, and the like, but
complexly, as a coincident form of legislation itself." Frank
Michelman, in writing that also undergirds the Rubenfeld and Fleming
efforts, provides a provocative point of departure for this revised
description. "In Kantian terms we are free only insofar as we are self-
governing, directing our actions in accordance with law-like reasons that
we adopt for ourselves, as proper to ourselves, upon conscious, critical
reflection on our identities (or natures) and social situations."58 A few
pages later, he observes: "[F]reedom-through-citizenship is a juristic as
well as a civic idea."59 Michelman himself means to build a model of
individual choice founded on adjudication.60 His aim, here and in later
Oakeshott & R. Peters, eds. 1962) (1651); see id. at 162-63 (in principle, no difference between
monarchical and popular commonwealths with respect to extent of freedom). See also PHILLIP
PETIT, REPUBLICANISM: A THEORY OF FREEDOM AND GOVERNMENT 37-50 (1997).
56. We might think of constitutional schemes as exercises in either apologetics or opposition.
In the first respect, constitutional descriptions of governmental arrangements and individual
guarantees function as depictions of state of affairs worth achieving or preserving. In the second
respect, constitutional descriptions serve to identify - directly or indirectly - hazards or evils. Cf.
JUDITH N. SHKLAR, THE FACES OF INJUSTCE 15-19 (1990) (justice and injustice as important
different starting points). Popular sovereignty is, within constitutional apologetics, a stand-in for
some positive conception of democracy ("We, the People"), often understood as both the
beginning and end of the enterprise. Within oppositionist constitutional thinking, popular
sovereignty is simply an explanation for why government action can claim no presumption of
legitimacy, why skepticism in the face of government action is always in order. Skepticism
becomes, or rather constitutional law attempts to make it become, that which government
confronts, that which individuals expect to bring to bear (at least initially). If so, legislative
jurisdiction must be incomplete, put at risk by the constitutional scheme. This essay, thus, is
written in oppositional terms. Actual constitutions, of course, as well as accompanying bodies of
constitutional law, are mixes of apologetic and oppositional elements.
57. Self-rule becomes, therefore, a commonplace phenomenon not reserved for historically
extraordinary moments.
58. Frank Michelman, Traces of Self-Government, 100 HARv. L. REv. 4, 26 (1986).
59. Id. at 28.
60. Situated practical judgment seems always to involve a combination of something general
with something specific, endorsement of both a general standard and a specific application, or of
both a general value and a specific means to its effectuation. Judgment mediates between the
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writing, is to vindicate a distinctively democratic conception of public
life, to insist upon a popular sovereignty, a self-government, that opens
usual institutions of government to individuals and their concerns - "the
full blast of sundry opinions and interest-articulations in society, includ-
ing everyone's opinions and articulations of interests."61
Individual rights as such appear to function mostly as means of
instituting and protecting democratic public life. Thus, for example,
"the privacies of personal refuge and intimacy," like property rights, are
said to "underpin[ ] the independence and authenticity of the citizen's
contribution to the collective determinations of public life."62 But the
idea that "self-governing" is "law-like" or "juristic," that "self-rule and
law-rule... amount[ ] to the same thing, 63 may be put to a second use
as well. Individual decisions as such might be literal acts of self-govern-
ment, jurisprudential instances as it were, constitutionally of a piece with
acts of legislators, administrators, or judges; constitutionally protected
because democratic life encompasses more than just the public processes
of official institutions of government.' To make sense of this variation,
of course, we need a closer account of self-government, a better sense of
its jurisdiction (as it were). We need, again to borrow Michelman's
terms, a better sense of which features of "law-rule are pertinent to a
concrete conception of "self-rule."
In this regard, we might make use of some of the results of the
work of Joseph Raz, and treat self-government, like law proper, as cru-
cially caught up with the notions of norms and authority. A norm is an
exclusionary reason - its content, for its adherent, substitutes for further
deliberation.6" Law claims authority insofar as it claims to be authorita-
tive, to state norms and thereby to preempt independent decision by its
general standard and the specific case. In order to apply the standard in the particular context
before us, we must interpret the standard. Every interpretation is a reconstruction of our sense of
the standard's ineaning and rightness. This process, in which the meaning of the rule emerges,
develops, and changes in the course of applying it to cases is one that every common law
practitioner will immediately recognize. Id. at 28-29.
61. Frank Michelman, The 1996-97 Brennan Center Symposium Lecture, 86 CAL. L. REv.
399, 425 (1998) [hereinafter Michelman, Brennan Lecture].
62. Frank Michelman, Law's Republic, 97 YALE L.J. 1493, 1501.
63. Id. at 1501.
64. "Although one encounters the notion of competencies most frequently when discussing
the judicial resolution of conflicts between levels of government, the notion is no less relevant
when discussing the resolution of conflicts between private and public authority, and even when
considering the resolution of conflicts between alternative private decision-makers." Laurence H.
Tribe, Toward a Model of Roles in the Due Process of Life and Law, 87 HARV. L. R~v 1, 13
(1973). For arguments that theories of justice - the theory of John Rawls in particular - should
address individual decision-making, see Liam Murphy, Institutions and the Demands of Justice,
27 PHEL. & PUB. Ars. 251 (1998); G.A. Cohen, Where the Action Is: On the Site of Distributive
Justice, 26 Pn. & PuB. AFF. 3 (1997).
65. See JOSEPH RAZ, PRACTnCAL REASON AND Noms 39 (2d ed. 1990).
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subjects. 66 Self-government, it now appears, may be understood to be
especially concerned with the decisions that individuals make that they
regard as exclusionary or preemptive - that, once made, they know will
likely substitute for and thus block decisionmaking anew. Self-govern-
ment is not equally implicated in all individual decisions - which are of
course preemptive for the moment - but rather singles out those particu-
lar decisions that address recurring situations and that the individual sees
as preemptive for the future, excluding renewed attention to issues or
questions when the situations indeed recur.67
This account possesses obvious constitutional affinities. It supplies
a basis for describing the inter-relation of two important notions that
otherwise appear to be only historically co-incident (at least in Anglo-
American political theory) - Harrington's retrieval of the Roman image
of "law's empire," the precursor of the formula "government of laws,"
and the emphasis in the writing of various English revolutionary theo-
rists upon the double sense of "self rule," the co-existence of "free state"
and "free people."68 A free state, it seemed to Hobbes and his succes-
sors, is not necessarily a state in which individuals are free, even if
under a government of laws. Legislative jurisdiction might be complete.
A republic, then, would differ little, with regard to individual freedom,
from say Byzantium.69 If the idea of the rule of law, however, is under-
stood in terms that include an acknowledgement of individual self rule,
the difference between "law's republic" and "law's empire" becomes
articulable. This compound conceptualization, moreover, is neatly
66. See JOSEPH RAz, AUTHORITY, LAW, AND MORALITY, IN ETHICS IN THE PUBLIC DOMAIN:
ESSAYS IN THE MORALITY OF LAW AND POLITICS 211-20 (1994).
67. In Raz's terms, self-government refers to those decisions that an individual makes that he
or she later treats as "second-order." See RAZ, PRACTICAL REASON, supra note 65, at 39-40, 71-
73.
Limiting self-government to preemptive decisions does not suppose, I think, that decision
that may be readily revisable - for example, opinions about unfolding political events - are not
important and do not warrant constitutional protection. These decisions do not acquire their
importance from their authoritative effect, however, and thus are not acts of individual
sovereignty. The reasons for constitutional protection must trace to other constitutional
commitments.
Preemptive decisions do not encompass only those decisions in which all options are each
preemptive. The individual acts legislatively, as it were, in deciding either to pre-empt or not pre-
empt. It is, in other words, the situation of deciding whether to foreclose future considerations,
and not the substance of the decision, that is of first constitutional interest.
68. QUENTIN SKINNER, LIBERTY BEFORE LIBERALISM 59-99 (1998).
69. "There is written on the turrets of the city of Lucca in great characters at this day, the
word LIBERTAS; yet no man can thence infer, that a particular man has more liberty, or
immunity from the service of the commonwealth there, than in Constantinople." HOBBES, supra
note 55, at 162. With respect to Byzantine legislative jurisprudence, Hobbes states what appears
to be still the prevailing view, at least as to aspiration. See, e.g., Maria Theres FRgen, Legislation
In Byzantium: A Political And Bureaucratic Technique, in LAW AND SOCIETY IN BYZANTIUM:
NiNTH-TWELFrH CENTURIES 53-70 (Angelici E., et al., eds., 1994).
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accomplished, in form at least, by the proposition that "no person shall
be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law."
Life, liberty, and property are sometimes matters of governmental dispo-
sition and sometimes not. "Due process of law" - repeatedly invoked
and brought to bear - generates the distribution. With respect to sub-
stance, finally, the notion of self-government owing to Raz comes into
play. Inset into the particular Real Property due process analytic, we
will see, the effort to identify matters of self-government initiates an
interplay likely capable of fracturing legislative jurisdiction, of therefore
affording a means within constitutional law for marking the significance
of popular sovereignty.
E.
Recognition of self-government marks as problematic, as matters
for investigation, 70 acts of government that prevent or otherwise disrupt
those choices that individuals make or might make for themselves that
the individuals would regard as dispositive, as preempting reconsidera-
tion notwithstanding continuing relevance.7" The decision whether or
70. Acts of government not implicating privacy as I define it here would be subject only to
ordinary rational basis review, unless such acts cut across other constitutional commitments.
71. Because I attribute a particular meaning to the term "self-government," it may be useful to
note some related but nonetheless different notions. Self-government sometimes carries
associations of participatory democracy, images of individual participation in public political
action of some form or another. See, e.g., RICHARD D. PARKER, "HERE THE PEOPLE RULE": A
CONSTrrTIONAL POPULIST MANIFESTO (1994). In contrast, I take self-government to refer to the
individual as such, treat government as the individual's effort to organize the self. For an
exemplary - and especially vertiginous effort of this sort, see WAI CHEE DUvIoCK, EMPIRE FOR
LIBERTY: MELVILLE AND THE POLmCS OF INDIvIDUALISM, 3-41 (1989). Self-government,
however, is also not just another version of "self-authoring" or "self-fashioning" - prominent
characterizations of autonomy. See, e.g., STEPHEN GREENBLATr, RENAISSANCE SELF-FASHIONING
2, 6 (1980). It seems to be an important part of the point of such interpretations of autonomy that
the freedom recognized is open-ended. See KAHN, supra note 54, at 156. No particular subset of
all possible individual decisions is marked out as especially relevant (although such limitations
may originate, as in Raz's account, in social forms, see RAZ, FREEDOM, supra note 45, at 307-13).
If self-government has political overtones, they are concern matters of "exit" not "voice." See
generally ALBERT 0. HIRSCHMAN, ExIT, VOICE, AND LOYALTY (1970). Thus they differ
substantially from "the political conception of the person" put forward by John Rawls, which
treats as primary the ideas of cooperation generally and the public presentation of beliefs in
particular. See JOHN RAWLS, POLITICAL LIBERALISM 29-35, 299-304 (1993); id. at 243-44 n.32
(analysis of right to abortion). Finally, there are plainly affinities linking self-government as I use
it here and the use to which Nikolas Rose puts it: "To the extent that we are governed in our own
name, we have a right to contest the evils that are done to us in the name of government, a right
that we acquire ... at the point of convergence of parties of government themselves." NIKOLAS
ROSE, POWERS OF FREEDOM: REFRAMING POLITICAL THOUGHT 284 (1999). Indeed, I will argue
that self-government within the Real Property frame precisely organizes "a complex field of
contestation," id. at 275, a sequence of assignments that "positively value ... strategies, tactics,
and practices that enhance human beings' capacities to act" and "correlatively ... subject all that
reduces such capacities to critical scrutiny." Id. at 97. But there are two important differences.
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not to become pregnant, to bear and raise a child, is a decision of this
sort, and thus decisions about contraception and abortion implicate self-
governance. Decisions about whom to marry, or about which family
members constitute immediate family, or about how to educate children
are plainly analogous. Rights acknowledged in the central line of Flor-
ida privacy cases, therefore, would also plainly serve as at least initial
triggers of the self-government inquiry.72
These easy cases for self-government scrutiny are notably heteroge-
neous in one respect. The reasons why decisions are not readily recon-
siderable, are therefore to be treated as authoritative, are varied:
sometimes in important part biological, sometimes moral consequences
of reliance by others, sometimes institutional. For purposes of judging
the relevance of the right of self-government, it should not matter, for
example, whether decisions as between heterosexual or homosexual
modes of intimacy are genetically biased.73 The crucial question, rather,
is whether such decisions are akin to commitments, fix ways of life
which (once begun) are not readily revised - even if free of genetic
governance, and if therefore "fixed" mostly for social or cultural rea-
sons.7 4 In an important sense, the decision that North Miami burdened
in Kurtz - whether or not to smoke tobacco - is also similar. Because
of the effects of tobacco use, the decision, once made, is not easily revis-
ited. Why should it matter that the decision to smoke is preemptive at
least in part for physio-chemical rather than, say, psychological or moral
Rose starts with and elaborates at length an idea of "freedom as it is instantiated in government,"
as "the problem space within which contemporary rationalities of government compete." Id. at
65, 94. In this essay, however, freedom as self-government is deployed first "as a formula of
resistance," as key to a politics of "contestation," id. at 65. It is "a relational and contextual
practice that takes shape in opposition," WENDY BROWN, STATES OF INJURY: POWER AND
FREEDOM IN LATE MODERNITY 6 (1995). Thus it marks government itself as "the problem space."
Government, as I use it, does not immediately take on the encompassing, Foucaldian scope that
Rose gives it; rather, consistent with seventeenth century revolutionary usages, see SKINNER,
LIBERTY BEFORE LIERALISM supra note 68, government is just the complex of law generating
institutions in the strict sense, whose "assemblages," ROSE, supra, at 276, are subject to breaking
apart. Within this narrowed usage, the presiding inspirational figure becomes Certeau not
Foucault: "tactics" disrupt "strategies," resisting individuals throw up "interior castles."
72. See, e.g., Von Eiff v. Azicri, 720 So. 2d 510 (Fla. 1998); In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186 (Fla.
1989).
73. I discuss infra how ultimate conclusions about self-government might be reached, using
the right to choose abortion as the principal example. See Janet Halley, Sexual Orientation and
the Politics of Biology: A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REv. 503
(1994).
74. The decisive consideration, thus, is not sexual intimacy as such or its particular details,
but the further fact of whether or not this intimacy is bound up with a form of life. See also note
45 supra. The Florida Supreme Court decisions upholding statutory rape laws are explainable, I
think, in these terms. See, e.g., J.A.S. v. State, 705 So. 2d 1381 (Fla. 1998); Jones v. State, 640
So. 2d 1084 (Fla. 1994). B.B. v. State, 659 So. 2d 256 (Fla. 1995), is probably best understood, as
Justice Kogan suggested, on page 260 of his concurrence as concerned with legal equality.
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reasons? The individual, at the time of decision, will likely regard the
decision as dispositive for the future.
A right of choice in matters of self-government does not reduce to
tests of "importance" or "significance" as such. The right to assisted
suicide, to request others to help terminate one's life, involves a matter
of always extraordinary consequence. It may not, however, be a ques-
tion of self-government in every case. From the perspective of govern-
ment, if government bans assisted suicide, individual choice is legally
preempted. But from the perspective of the individual, were the individ-
ual free to choose, the choice to terminate one's life resists ready charac-
terization. Resolution once and for all occurs not because the individual
will hereafter treat the decision as authoritatively settled, but because the
individual deciding is "in the hereafter" - no longer present to abide by
(or reconsider) the decision. Self-government posits continuing exist-
ence; decisions to die, of course, contemplate otherwise. The opportu-
nity to decide whether not to request termination of one's life may
present itself repeatedly; if so, a choice in one instance not to request
termination would leave open later renewed consideration of the matter.
There could be, however, circumstances in which an individual con-
fronts a likely last chance - surgery or other intensive courses of treat-
ment might present a real risk of triggering a vegetative state. If so, a
decision not to request termination would have preemptive long-term
effects, and would therefore be a matter of self-government. And thus,
derivatively and only in these circumstances, a decision (conditionally,
presumably) to request termination would also be subsumed.7 5
But what of decisions by individuals or their agents to refuse or
withdraw consent to medical treatment? In Browning and Dubreuil,
cases in which refusal plainly put life at risk, the Florida Supreme Court
stated that the constitutional right of privacy includes "the right to
choose or refuse medical treatment, and that right extends to all relevant
decisions concerning one's health. 76 Some decisions about medical
treatment fix - or at the time appear to fix - long-term consequences,
and therefore fit within the self-government account. The current under-
standing of the right of privacy is plainly more encompassing. We
might wonder, however, whether discussion of privacy was actually
required to explain constitutional protection of a right to refuse medical
treatment. Common law torts jurisprudence holds that medical treat-
ment ordinarily presupposes patient consent.77 Common law agency
75. This distinction does not appear to have been considered (one way or another) in the case
law so far. See, e.g., Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So. 2d 97 (Fla. 1997).
76. Guardianship of Browning, 568 So. 2d 4, 11 (Fla. 1990); accord., In re Dubreuil, 629 So.
2d 819, 822 (Fla. 1993).
77. See Browning, 568 So. 2d at 10.
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doctrines recognize a general power possessed by individuals to author-
ize surrogates to act on their behalf. The Florida constitutional guarantee
of legal equality78 should regulate the ability of the state legislature or
courts to limit consent requirements without sufficient reason.79 The
right to refuse medical treatment therefore acquires a constitutional set-
ting independent of either privacy or self-government notions.
F.
Individuals themselves should make decisions which have long-
term consequences for themselves. We can appreciate why individuals
would want this opportunity. The reasonableness of the proposition,
however, does not in and of itself establish that individuals, in all cir-
cumstances, indeed ought to be able to make long-term choices, espe-
cially if the decisions also have consequences for others. We may
suspect that most matters of long-term significance have, in one way or
another, consequences for others. Within the Real Property framework,
consistently with this backdrop, the claim of right is only one element.
The reasons for government action restricting or nullifying individual
decision-making are equally relevant.
Examined closely, Real Property appears to raise difficult issues,
both within the field of its original application and with respect to its
extension encompassing a due process right of self-government. This is
the gist of Justice Barkett's conclusions: If prosecutors can show, by
clear and convincing evidence, that property was put to use for criminal
activity the property forfeits to the state, terminating all rights to the
property of individuals who are unable to show, by a preponderance of
evidence, their ignorance of the property's criminal use. If property is
put to criminal use, why should the ignorance of the owners protect their
rights? In connection with rights to real property, it is easy to imagine
rights holders who would in fact not know what was going on - mort-
gage holders or landlords, for example. Why not, however, impose a
duty to monitor, put such rights holders to work in the crime control
effort? It seems harder still to make sense of the Real Property formula
in connection with rights of self-government, since rights holders them-
selves will typically be initiators of the activity that provokes the state's
concern. Is ignorance here in any sense a relevant notion?
Ignorance per se may not be the immediate issue. State of mind is
often an inference from circumstances - and, especially in the case of
organizations, a more or less figurative conclusion. Mortgage holders
78. Fla. Const., art. I, § 2.
79. Enforcing legal equality sets aside the question of whether the general rule that battery is
wrongful without consent is itself constitutionally required.
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and landlords - if that is what they really are - are engaged in conduct
other than that which triggers government intervention (so we assume).
The purpose of forfeiture, after all, is not to capture criminal property,
but to deny individuals who engage in criminal activity access to prop-
erty as part and parcel of that activity. Rights holders establish ignorance
by establishing that their activities, vis a vis property at issue, are sepa-
rate from criminal uses of the property. We might suppose that individ-
uals claiming rights of self-government could also show that the project
within which choice matters for them - there must be some such project
or the notion of long-term consequences would be beside the point - is
similarly distinct from the consequences that supply reason for govern-
ment intervention. Individuals take into account effects on themselves.
This is not necessarily selfishness as such, but simply preoccupation
with whatever matters for them. Government, by contrast, might be
understood to adopt a perspective attentive to consequences that are
independent of, or more complicated than, the individual's own con-
cerns.80 If these conditions hold, an individual claiming a right to
choose could meet the Real Property ignorance test by showing that the
choice at issue is part of a project, a set of concerns or aims, that does
not substantially overlap pertinent government concerns or aims. The
applicability of the right positions the individual to demonstrate that,
more likely than not, ordinarily pressing government worries are inappo-
site in the circumstances.81
This account supposes that the government cannot simply identify
the particular choice as such - instead of its attendant consequences - as
the reason for prohibition.82 Within federal constitutional law, that
option is not ordinarily available to Congress (or to its defenders)
because federal statutes must be describable in terms which refer to the
Article I, Section 8, legislative agenda - figure as "means" to constitu-'
tional "ends."83 Florida constitutional law, we might think, recognizes a
80. Within these terms, it is enough that the government concerns are sufficiently distinct.
They might reflect some altogether impartial "public" interest, the interests of particular other
individuals, or a mixed agenda. The propriety of particular versions of these alternatives may be,
of course, the subject of other parts of constitutional law.
81. Alan Michaels derives constitutional requirements of "innocence" - obligations of
government to show that burdened individuals act knowingly or at least carelessly - from the
existence of background constitutional rights. Absent proof of intent or negligence, the conduct
triggering sanction would fall within the scope of a constitutional right. This analysis, plainly,
supposes a notion of decisive rights. Alan C. Michaels, Constitutional Innocence, 112 HARV. L.
REv. 828, 877-78 (1999). In the Real Property setting, in contrast, "constitutional innocence"
originates in doubt about government reasons for acting, doubt which is authorized by the
relevance of the threshold right.
82. See generally ROBERT F. NAGEL, CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURES: THE MENTALITY AND
CONSEQUENCES OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 84-105 (1989).
83. McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819).
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similar subject matter restriction on legislative jurisdiction, in the form
of the familiar preoccupations of the police power, and therefore
requires a similarly instrumental rationalization.
G.
The two parts of the Real Property formula are simply reversed
accounts of the underlying idea of forfeiture. Forfeiture, we can there-
fore see, incorporates two counter-propositions. Rights are forfeit if the
projects defining their exercise (or defined by their exercise) address
matters government identifies as wrongful. Rights, it appears, are condi-
tional upon government definitions of wrongfulness. Rights prevail,
even if the consequences of their exercise are properly matters of gov-
ernment concern, if the terms within which rights are framed or exer-
cised happen not to include such government matters. Government
objectives, it appears, are conditional upon individual definitions of
right. The opposed tendencies of these propositions are not reconciled
or otherwise managed by the notion of forfeiture itself they only illumi-
nated. Real Property, however, plainly presupposes some sort of medi-
ating mechanism if its formula is supposed to point, in particular cases,
in the direction of particular conclusions.
It is not sufficient, presumably, to treat specific applications of the
formula as random results of the interaction of two plausible proposi-
tions - something like a coin toss. 4 Both individual rights and govern-
mental concerns are depicted, within Justice Barkett's account, as of
equal significance, but also as threshold matters: we need not (or so I
have supposed) elaborate in isolation the substance of such rights and
concerns past the point of initial plausibility because the real work of
investigation and justification will come in the course of gauging inter-
action. An account like Barkett's would therefore abandon any claim to
yield persuasive conclusions if result-generating is labeled as ad hoc.
For much the same reason, we might also wish to resist Cass Sunstein's
recent suggestion that difficult-to-resolve conflicts of individual rights
and government concerns should ordinarily be resolved in ways that
minimize the substantive engagement of adjudicators." "Breyerian
thickets"86 cannot be regarded as only occasional, and therefore avoida-
ble, phenomena within an account that begins precisely by putting in
conflict individual claims and government objectives. Matthew Adler's
84. Cf Jon Elster, Solomonic Judgments: Against the Best Interests of the Child, 54 U. CHI.
L. R~v. 1, 40-43 (1987).
85. See CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE SUPREME
COURT (1999).
86. See Denver Area Educ. Telecom. v. FCC, 518 U.S. 727, 742 (1996)(opinion of Breyer,
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description of constitutional rights as "rights against rules" is more help-
ful insofar as it emphasizes the interaction of particular claims of right
and reasons for government action.87 For his purposes, however, Profes-
sor Adler finds it sufficient to stop short, to show only that usual judicial
characterizations of rights take the form of tests of the adequacy of gov-
ernment reasons for action. What counts as an "overriding reason" is a
question he is prepared to leave "open to debate," simply a matter of
"fleshing out" implications of his "derivative account" of constitutional
rights.88
Justice Kogan's dissent in Kurtz suggests something of the form of
what might follow next - the form of the "debate" that Adler supposes.
Kogan distinguishes between "speculative pretense" and "rational gov-
ernmental policy."89 He worries about "a 'slippery slope' problem" and
also the problem of a "poor fit between the governmental objective and
the ends actually achieved."90 But he also acknowledges that the "right"
government action would be constitutional. "If the federal government,
for instance, chose to regulate tobacco as a controlled substance, I have
no trouble saying that this act alone does not undermine anyone's pri-
vacy right."9 These phrasings, of course, are hardly idiosyncratic. For
example, Justice Barkett in Real Property similarly declares that state
interests must be "narrowly tailored."92 Indeed, we all know, terms like
these are in common use in constitutional law generally (this is Profes-
sor Adler's starting point.) Even a glance at his actual language, how-
ever, reveals that Justice Kogan (and Justice Barkett as well as
seemingly every other judge) is interested not so much in "rights against
rules" as in characterizations of rights as against characterizations of
reasons for government action. Adjudication is, quite literally, a "lan-
guage game."93 It is, as well, a game which makes use of a particular
feature of language that, again we all know, is especially prominent in,
indeed perhaps constitutive of, legal language generally - the ready
availability of multiple terms capable of identifying any given phenome-
non.94 This redundancy allows a particular course of action, for exam-
87. Matthew D. Adler, Rights Against Rules: The Moral Structure of American Constitutional
Law, 97 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1998).
88. Id. at 6, 107.
89. City of Miami v. Kurtz, 653 So. 2d at 1025, 1029 (Fla. 1995).
90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Department of Law Enf. v. Real Property, 588 So. 2d at 957 (Fla. 1991).
93. Cf Jaako Hintikka & Gabriel Sandu, Game-Theoretical Semantics, in HANDBOOK OF
Locic AND LANGUAGE 361-410 (Johan van Bethem & Alice ter Meulen eds., 1997).
94. This nominal pluralism is sometimes seen as problematic. From this perspective, it is
addressed as "indeterminacy" or the "level of generality" puzzle, as a kind of cloud constitutional
analysis should work to dispel. See LAURENCE TRIBE & MICHAEL DORF, ON READING THE
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
ple, to be described in sometimes entirely different terms as either an
individual choice or a public problem. Similarly, it is this redundancy
that allows the same course of action to be identified in terms which
group it with many other, putatively similar courses of action, or in
terms which mark the course of action as individual or unique. These
possibilities - or rather, their handling or mishandling - create the risks
of slippery slopes and misfits to which judges refer.95
The Real Property formula defines one such legal language game,
as equally apt for testing liberty to self-govern as the priority of property
rights. An individual offers an account of the long-term structuring con-
sequences of a particular choice (with respect to at least one of the
options presented by the choice). The government may counter by sug-
gesting that this choice is subsumed within a larger class of options that
are relevantly equivalent but are not precluded by the government action
at issue. The government for its part contends that the choice in ques-
tion has distinctive effects that are properly matters of public interest.
The individual may, in turn, disaggregate the category or generalize it,
showing in either case that other activities, that are not similarly matters
of individual long-term choice, produce like consequences, and are
therefore alternative targets for regulation. Finally, the individual may
describe the matter subject to choice in terms designed to suggest the
irrelevance (for the individual) of the aspects of the matter that prompt
government involvement. The government might then attempt to show
that the point of the choice for the individual in fact suggests an incrimi-
nating overlap.
Easy cases occur when one or the other participant is unable to
CONsTIrTON (1991). For an effort, as here, to make use of indeterminacy as part of the
substance of constitutional argument, see Michelman, Brennan Lecuture, supra note 61.
95. There are, in principle, at least two types of characterization games implicit in
constitutional jurisprudence generally. The first - which starts with the idea of taxonomy -
supposes sequences of opposed categories (say, subjects of liberty of contract and subjects of legal
regulation) and seeks to classify particular acts under one or the other heading. An argument in
favor of a given explanation fails if within its terms so many acts would be classified similarly that
the organizing idea of taxonomy would therefore lose meaning. Justice Peckham's opinion in
Lochner v. New York, 198 U.S. 45 (1905), illustrates especially well the form of argument within a
taxonomic characterization game. A second game starts with the idea of overlap - particular acts
may well be plausibly described as, say, exercises of individual freedom and subjects of
legislative concern. There is no set legislative agenda or regime of personal freedom. The
question, rather, is whether which of the competing accounts captures better the attributes of the
particular act or acts at issue. If an account is as easily understood as referring to other acts, it
loses salience (at least in the face of a competing account) as a governing account of the act in
question. Chief Justice Hughes' opinion in Home Building & Loan Assoc. v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S.
398 (1934), is perhaps the best exemplar of overlap analysis, depicting insistence upon contract
rights as itself the "emergency" to which a legislative mortgage moratorium responds. The
characterization game that I associate with Real Property is one of this second type - an overlap
game.
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offer either an initial characterization or a counter argument. If both
participants frame and critique (through however many iterations), bur-
den of proof rules become decisive. If the individual has not made a
plausible case for characterizing the choice as one of long-term conse-
quences, the government prevails. Otherwise, if the government fails to
show that the choice presents a distinct public problem, or if the individ-
ual plausibly establishes that her or his activities do not require the indi-
vidual to address the issues provoking the government, the individual
prevails.
The play of argument, it should be apparent, turns not just on the
relative generality of competing descriptions, but on differences in the
content of descriptions attributable to the alternative standpoints. The
precise orientation of points of view may therefore prove significant.
Consider, for example, the familiar question of a woman's right to
choose whether or not to obtain an abortion. The individual would
claim self-government. The state might counter by asserting an interest
in the life of the fetus. The woman invoking the right would, presuma-
bly, be pregnant - the choice and the consequences of the possible
courses would be, for her, immediately and concretely real. "Having an
unwanted child can go a long way toward ruining a woman's life."9 6 In
contrast, legislation prohibiting abortion, because of its general form,
addresses all women (within the jurisdiction) who become pregnant.
Absent abortion, a very large percentage of all conceived fetuses
would be born alive. But it is also necessary to take note of the likeli-
hood that any given pregnant woman - any one woman identified only
as a member of the population of all pregnant women - would choose to
have an abortion. Justification of the legislation, therefore, must include
and defend the particular likelihood supposed. (In the United States at
present about one in four of all pregnant women choose abortion.)
Whatever protection legislation might afford the lives of fetuses must
also be adjusted to reflect the likely number of illegal abortions that
would occur notwithstanding the legislation. If the risk of abortion for
any one fetus, in the end, appears to be relatively low (this would be the
subject of argument), and thus the added protection is correspondingly
limited, then the legislation, given its aim of protecting life, may become
vulnerable to less restrictive alternative analysis. All sorts of govern-
ment acts and refusals to act increase risks of death in small increments
for all individuals within the jurisdiction (just as other government acts
and refusals to act slightly reduce risks of death.) It becomes difficult,
therefore, for government to claim any distinctive concern with respect
to "background" changes in life chances for conceived fetuses in partic-
96. Ely, supra note 16, at 923.
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ular. Changes in a relatively small number of government polices might
increase protection of life just as much as prohibition of abortion.97 The
lives protected might not be those of fetuses. But at the level of abstrac-
tion at which anti-abortion legislation proceeds, it is not easy to under-
stand how defenders of the legislation could discern a defensible
preference for fetal life as opposed to other human life. (Anti-abortion
laws typically - and tellingly for present purposes - include an excep-
tion for abortions necessary to save the life of the pregnant woman.)
If the legislation is read to address only women who are pregnant
and whose conceived fetuses are viable, the analysis changes dramati-
cally. It is now the claim of the right of self-government that becomes
vulnerable. Such women, it may be supposed, are not clearly set in their
views about maternity - why otherwise would they wait so long to seek
an abortion?98 If so, it may not be sufficiently persuasive for them to
claim that (for them) maternity marks a dramatic (and therefore authori-
tative) change in life. The individuals claiming the right to choose abor-
tion would need to point to either late-developing circumstances such as
newly-discovered health risks or extenuating reasons for hesitancy.
Otherwise, relatively abstract and attenuated legislative concerns would
stand uncountered. It might also be argued, on behalf of the legislation,
that women who assert the right to choose abortion post-viability are
ambiguously situated. The grim possibility cannot be immediately
excluded that the reason for their choice is precisely counter to the rea-
son for legislation - that the women now choose abortion precisely for
the purpose of terminating human life. Again, to be plausible, the claim
of the right to self-government would require special explanation.
H.
The game framework straightforwardly expresses Real Property's
agnosticism. At the outset, no priority attaches to either the substance of
individual choices (so long as they pertain to long-term matters) or gov-
ernment concerns. Constitutional inquiry need not proceed in parallel
with political and moral argument - which in the case of abortion, for
example, tends to begin with either an asserted hierarchy of values or a
claim of irreconcilable conflict.99 The game framework also summa-
rizes aptly the logic of argument that we would expect to unfold in a
97. See also RONALD DWORKIN, LIFE'S DOMINION 115-16 (1993) (comparing desensitizing
effects of abortions, executions, and failures to reduce infant mortality).
98. "In almost all cases, a woman knows she is pregnant in good time to make a reflective
decision before the fetus is viable." Id. at 169; see also id. at 151 ("no reason why government
should not aim that its citizens treat decisions about human life and death as matters of serious
moral imprudence").
99. See generally LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES (1990).
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case like Kurtz. Government might counter the individual claim that
smoking is a decision preemptive of reconsideration (easy reconsidera-
tion, anyway), and therefore properly a matter of personal choice. Nico-
tine ingestion can occur in other ways, thus discouraging or banning
smoking leaves the individual with equivalent options: the smoking
decision as such is not decisive after all. Or as we have noted already,
the individual might argue, against the government justification of
reducing insurance costs, that alternative partitions of the applicant pool
would yield similar savings.
Does the game framework supply an independent basis for valuing
the end-result of the interaction? This becomes an important question
precisely to the degree that constitutional analysis departs from modes of
argument otherwise used to address a question at issue. (Again, the con-
trast with usual abortion debate supplies the most obvious example.) In
part, we might think, the game justifies itself just because it takes seri-
ously both individual rights (of property and self-government) and gov-
ernment agendas. The text of the Florida Constitution in various ways
also recognizes both (however obliquely with regard to government
agendas). The due process clause in particular, we have already seen,
seems to suppose the possibility of limitations of liberty and property
either conforming to or departing from due process." ° The medium of
the game - its origin in the richness of legal language - suggests that
adjudication structured in this way is not only "constitutional" but
"law."
But it is the burden of proof rules, finally decisive for purposes of
analysis, that must carry the most normative weight. The Real Property
formula, notwithstanding its doubleness, manifestly incorporates an
asymmetry. Individuals succeed in showing that a choice is indeed a
matter of self-government, or as well a matter of "constitutional inno-
cence," if support for their assertion (insofar as facts are in dispute) sat-
isfies the preponderance test. The government, however, can establish
that a free choice has adverse public results only if evidence is clear and
convincing. This difference, we can readily see, supplies the game with
its dynamic. It pushes the one side (government) to pick a characteriza-
tion of its concerns about the individual's choice which will seem mani-
festly pertinent - to fix an initial level of generality. The individual in
turn may seek to recharacterize her or his choice more abstractly or more
specifically than the government did, or dissect the relevance of the gov-
ernment concerns; the government may respond; the iteration proceeds.
100. Limitations consistent with due process, of course, might nonetheless infringe some other
constitutional provision.
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There is no reason functionally, though, if the point is simply to propel
the inquiry, why the greater burden could not be borne by the individual.
Substantively, however, as a matter of constitutional law, placing
the greater burden on government obviously expresses and gives con-
crete meaning to popular sovereignty, surely a "value the [c]onstitution
marks as special." 10' Individuals are prior to government; therefore, it is
government action that requires added justification at the margin. The
Real Property formula, therefore, not only resonates with constitutional
texts and works through to its conclusions precisely within familiar
resources of legal language, but also instantiates an originating premise
of the constitutional project at large. It is, it seems, the very model of
constitutional law.
I.
Would Justice Barkett recognize all of this as her handiwork?
Would Justice Kogan think that these were the propositions that he was
signaling should be brought to bear?
In his dissent in the assisted suicide case, Krischer v. Mclver, Jus-
tice Kogan included this footnote:
It is important to distinguish this broader concept of "ordered liberty"
from the narrower "liberty interests" protected by due process, with
their different contexts and contrasting burdens of proof. Compare
Department of Law Enforcement v. Real Property ... (due process
guarantees inherent fairness; government can infringe property rights
only upon clear and convincing evidence) with In re Browning....
(privacy guarantees personal autonomy; state can justify infringe-
ments only for "compelling" interest enforced through least intrusive
means). 10 2
The compelling interest requirement, in Kogan's view, reflects a
commitment "of the Justices and judges of Florida ... to guarantee and
enforce . . . basic rights."'1 3 We might wonder whether this reading is
accurate. It is not just the manifestly conclusory assertion of compelling
interest in the majority opinion in Krischer itself. Other privacy cases
also show that, at least sometimes, references to compelling interest are
as much or more means of asserting the priority of state authority vis a
vis claims of individual right. This ambivalence is evident from the out-
set in Florida's privacy jurisprudence, appearing indeed as an organizing
theme in now-Judge Cope's still-extraordinary account of the 1977
101. Ely, supra note 16, at 949.
102. Krischer v. Mclver, 697 So.2d 97, 113 n.18 (Fla. 1997). Kurtz, Kogan must have thought,
was not really a privacy case at all - plainly he distinguished between the Real Property due
process inquiry and privacy right enforcement as such.
103. Id. at 111.
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drafting history of the privacy right.10 4 There are, of course, individual
rights that Florida courts treat the Florida constitution as strongly pro-
tecting. 0 5 But the compelling interest test does not appear to be either
necessary or sufficient to the task.
Substituting the due process interplay of Real Property for the pri-
vacy right compelling interest formula, therefore, may not represent a
reduction in the actual level of protection of individual rights. Real
Property is inconsistent, obviously, with the idea of "basic rights" in one
sense. Rights are not definitive; once understood to be relevant, they do
not "trump," do not just because of their relevance decide matters.
Rights if relevant, however, are "basic" in the sense of serving as start-
ing points; initiate a comparative exercise, a process of testing salience
that may result in either the enforcement of rights or recognition of gov-
ernment authority. Because the interaction of claims of public concern
and claims of individual right is the organizing preoccupation of the
Real Property approach, the fundamental fact of the Florida constitu-
tional scheme (indeed, all American constitutions) might be acknowl-
edged more often than obscured - government and self-government are
both constitutional commitments, each a critique of the other, neither
therefore beyond question.
In one important respect, of course, a shift in emphasis from the
right of privacy to the right of self-government would seem to be radical
indeed. Explicit constitutional protection of privacy is a distinctive -
and often applauded - feature of the Florida constitution. The idea of
privacy, however, has had to be forced; has had to be rather arbitrarily
redefined by Florida courts and commentators to make it cover the
claims that come easily within the idea of self-government. Privacy in
its ordinary sense - privacy per se - is not associated so much with
choice (except with regard to waiver) as with secrecy, nondisclosure, or
anonymity. It was, we all know, privacy carrying these latter associa-
tions that Brandeis and Warren sought to protect; it was this privacy that
then-Chief Justice Overton invoked in urging constitutional protection at
the revision proceedings in 1977.106 Privacy per se has sometimes been
a subject of Florida supreme court opinions. 10 7 The depth and extent of
its legal protection seem, perhaps especially at this moment, to be salient
questions. 10 8 A constitutional jurisprudence of privacy actually con-
cerned with privacy might, therefore, be an idea whose time has come.
104. See Cope, supra note 13.
105. See, e.g., Tramel v. Stewart, 697 So. 2d 821 (Fla. 1997); Butterworth v. Caggiano, 605
So. 2d 56 (Fla. 1992)(constitutional homestead protections bar forfeitures).
106. See Cope, supra note 13.
107. E.g., Post-Newsweek Stations v. Doe, 612 So. 2d 549 (Fla. 1992).
108. See generally Thomas Nagel, Concealment and Exposure, 27 Puni. & PuB. Ai'. 3 (1998).
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